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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 782(a)-3(2)(h) as this is an appeal from a final judgment
and order in a domestic relations action.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Has the Appellant marshalled all of the

evidence and, despite such evidence, demonstrated that
the Trial Court's distribution of property was clearly
erroneous or an abuse of discretion?
2.

In Arguendo, did the Trial Court err in

determining that the premarital portion of the McGinty
Ranch was a joint venture between the parties and,
therefore, the Court equally divided the premarital
portion.
3.

With respect to that portion of the ranch

acquired during the marriage, should the Trial Court have
utilized the presumption of equal distribution and, from
the evidence, determined that each of the parties had
contributed substantial time and money to the ranch such
as to justify an equal distribution?
4.

Does any legal authority exist which would

justify a pro rata distribution of the ranch and, even
if such authority existed, would it be utilized when
Appellant relies upon misstatements of fact as a basis
for his argument?
1

5.

Is the appeal frivolous and intended to

delay a recovery of the ranch from the defaulting buyer
so as to deprive the Appellee of her portion of the
proceeds and, if so, is she entitled to an award of her
costs and attorney's fee pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As more fully discussed in Point I of the
Argument, the sound discretion of a Trial Court in the
distribution of property will not be overturned unless
it is clearly erroneous or a clear abuse of discretion.
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; also see
authorities cited in Point I of this brief.
With respect to Issue 5, Appellee urges this
Court to award her costs and attorney's fee on this
appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure which confers original determination of the
merits of the appeal to this Court.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
With the exception of the Rules previously
cited,

there

are

no

statutory

or

constitutional

provisions that are determinative of the issues on appeal
in this case.

2

RECORD ON APPEAL
References to the Trial Transcript will be made
as follows:

(TT

) . Such reference will be utilized

because the District Court Clerk did not paginate the
Trial Transcript.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce
entered by the Seventh Judicial District Court of Grand
County, State of Utah. The case at bar was tried before
the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson on the 11th day of June,
1993. The Court entered its Memorandum Decision (Addendum
A) on June 18, 1993. After several motions, the Court
entered

its

Findings

of

Fact

(hereafter

"FF"),

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce on August 11,
1993 (Addendum B) . Plaintiff/Appellant filed Notice of
Appeal in the present case on September 3, 1993 (ROA 369370) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee offers the following statement of
relevant facts in the present case:
1.

The

Plaintiff/Appellant

referred to as "Cotton") and the

(hereinafter

Defendant/Appellee

(hereinafter referred to as "Lee") met in 1963 in Saudi
Arabia at a time when both were employed by the Arabian
American Oil Company ("ARAMCO"). (FF 3).

3

marriage

2.

A romance blossomed almost immediately but

was

not

possible

because

of the

nepotism

policies of ARAMCO and because Lee, a devout Catholic,
could not marry Cotton unless the church granted a
dispensation pertaining to Cotton's earlier divorce (TT
147-149; FF 3).
3.

After approximately seven (7) years of

working on the dispensation, it was finally received in
late 1975 (TT 151-152; FF 3).
4.

Both of the parties were also in the

process of retiring from ARAMCO so that the nepotism
policies of the company would no longer prevent their
marriage (FF 3)•
5.

The parties were married on June 18, 1976

at Palo Alto, California and immediately moved to the
McGinty ranch in Castle Valley, Utah (FF 2) . The marriage
was Lee's first and Cotton's second marriage,
6.

Almost

from

the

beginning

of

their

relationship, Cotton and Lee had planned to spend their
lives together (TT 154-155). While in Saudi Arabia, the
parties could not marry because of the nepotism policies
of ARAMCO

(TT 149-150; FF 3) and they could not live

together because of the cultural problems that could have
subjected Lee to "stoning" (TT 150-151), but the parties
maintained a close personal relationship and planned for
their future (TT 154-157).
4

7.

By the late 1960's, Lee and Cotton were

searching for investment properties to provide them both
with future retirement monies and a retirement home (TT
154-155; FF 7).
8.

From the late 1960's until the time of the

parties' marriage in 1976, Lee consistently provided
Cotton with monies to be utilized in the acquisition of
joint venture properties and a retirement home in the
belief that the parties would ultimately marry and retire
together (FF 7).
9.

Although

approximately

$3,000.00

was

transferred by Lee to Cotton for investment purposes
prior to 1970 (TT 154), Lee's documentary evidence was
vague during this time period (TT 154).
10.
Grand

County,

Both parties made numerous trips to the
Utah

area

for

purposes

of

locating

investment and/or retirement properties and, on one such
trip in 1970, Cotton located what would become known as
the McGinty ranch (TT 154-157).
11.

Since Lee was still in Saudi Arabia at

that time, she made plans for immediate transfers of
funds to Cotton

for the purpose

of completing

the

$10,000.00 down payment on the McGinty ranch in December
of 1970. She transferred a total of $6,200.00 to him for
that purpose. (TT 180; Exhibit 9; FF 7).
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12.

After

transferring

$6,200.00

for

the

original down payment, Lee continued to transfer sums of
money into Cotton's accounts to facilitate the operation
and improvement of the ranch (TT 181; FF 7, 8, 9 and 10) .
13.
as well

Cotton held title to the McGinty ranch,

as various
trustee

other parcels of joint venture

property,

as

for

collected

all rents and

the

partnership,

income from the

and

he

investment

properties and returned same into the development of the
properties (TT 181-192; FF 10).
14.

Both of the parties made numerous trips

to Utah and utilized the McGinty ranch as their home in
the United States prior to the time of their marriage (TT
155-157).
15.

The ranch earned approximately $5,000.00

per year from the time of its acquisition in 1970 until
the time of the parties' marriage in 1976 and all of that
income was utilized to make payments on the ranch and
improve the property (TT 43, 83).
16.

Following the purchase of the ranch, Lee

continued to transfer funds to Cotton in the sums of at
least $1,800.00 in June of 1971 (TT 182) for a payment
on the ranch, $1,500.25 in March of 1972 (TT 186-189) for
the acquisition of the Brown/Terry property which would
ultimately become the Jenks property, and $7,000.00 in

6

1973

(TT 189-192) for the acquisition of the Miller

property (FF 7) .
17.

In September of 1976, the Miller property

was sold and Lee received one-half (h) of the proceeds
from the sale, namely

$9,965.30, all of which she

deposited back into the family accounts (TT 191-192).
18.

The Brown/Terry property was subsequently

sold to Mr. Jenks in 1988 and both Lee and Cotton
executed

documents

for

the

sale.

They

received

approximately $33,000.00 from Mr. Jenks over a two and
one-half (2^) year time period and all of the proceeds
were deposited into the ranch and household accounts (TT
188-189) .
19.

Prior to her marriage in 1976, Lee also

utilized her personal funds to purchase furniture and
appliances for the ranch house and caused same to be
delivered

to the ranch house

so that

it would be

functional by the time the parties arrived to set up
house hold (TT 157-158) (FF 7).
20.

As of the date of their marriage in June

of 1976, Lee had substantial cash savings in excess of
$35,000.00 (TT 164-179, 194-198) and Cotton had no cash
savings (TT 87-89, 198).
21.

Following the date of the marriage, each

of the parties contributed their social security checks
and pension checks into their joint ranch and family
7

accounts (TT 192-195), and all of the monthly payments
for the ranch from the date of the marriage until the
payoff of the ranch in 1983 came from those accounts (FF
8).
22.

Immediately preceding the payoff of the

ranch, Lee withdrew $15,000.00 from her sole and separate
premarital accounts and deposited said sum into the joint
ranch account so that Cotton could write check #1437 on
September 23, 1983 in the sum of $13,638.47 to pay off
the entire remaining balance on the McGinty ranch (TT
199-204; Exhibits 36, 37, 38 and 39 [Addendum D] ; FF 8).
23.

Following their marriage, the parties made

substantial

improvements to the ranch including the

remodeling

of the ranch house and bunk house, the

installation

of

a piped

irrigation

system

and

the

doubling of hay production. They also acquired additional
equipment for the operation of the ranch (TT 132; FF 9).
24.

The parties frequently listed the ranch

for sale in an attempt to realize a significant return
on their investment and, Cotton acted as though Lee were
a joint owner of the ranch by having her sign and
participate in all listing agreements and deeds for the
sale of portions of the property, like the Jenks property
(TT 135-136, 238; FF 10).
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25.

Lee utilized

much

of her pre-marital

savings to improve and make lump sum payments on the
ranch (TT 208,213).
26.

Lee was never repaid

for any of the

transfers of money that went into the McGinty ranch or
the Jenks property and she placed all of her return from
the Miller property back into the ranch accounts (TT 189,
191-192, 199-203; FF 7).
27.

The

ranch was purchased

in

1970 for

$80,000.00 and was worth $425,000.00 at the time of
trial. Though most of the appreciation had occurred in
the two (2) years prior to the trial and was due to
recent

market

increases,

marital

improvements

also

effected the value of the ranch (TT 129-132; FF 7).
28.

Cotton filed for divorce on December 26,

1991 (ROA 1).
29.

Cotton's attorney drafted a restraining

order against the disposition of any property during the
pendency of the action which was in full force and effect
at the time that Cotton sold the ranch to Darr Hatch (FF
12) .
30.

Without notifying attorney Sandy Dolowitz,

trial counsel for Cotton, Cotton accompanied Darr Hatch
to Utah County so that Mr. Hatch's law firm could prepare
the documents which transferred ownership of the ranch
to Mr. Hatch pursuant to a Contract of Sale. Cotton and
9

Hatch also contended

the sale

included

all of the

household goods, farm equipment and vehicles that had
been previously owned by Cotton and Lee, although no
inventories were included on the sales contract and no
security interests in the personal property were ever
perfected (TT 100-110, 117-124).
31.

On June 11, 1993 trial was held and Judge

Anderson received testimony and numerous exhibits. He
entered his Memorandum Decision (Addendum A) on June 18,
1993 and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce were entered on August 11, 1993 (Addendum B).
32.

At the time of trial, Darr Hatch was

substantially delinquent in the payments on the ranch
and Cotton had made no attempt whatsoever to collect the
past due payments or foreclose on the property (TT 108110) .
33.

At the time of trial, Cotton contended

that he had no vehicle left but was driving a little red
sports car "on loan" from Darr Hatch. (TT 102).
34.

As

of the

time

of this

appeal, the

defaulting buyer remains in possession of the property
although no payments whatsoever have been made since the
time of the trial. All attempts to remove the defaulting
buyer from the property have been met with delaying
tactics by Cotton and counsel. (Affidavit of Counsel,
Addendum C)•
10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Lee contends that Cotton has failed to meet the
standard of review required in this case. He has failed
to present any legal basis for an appeal and he has not
even attempted to marshal 1 all of the evidence that
supported the Trial Courtis Findings. As such, this Court
should refuse to consider his attack upon the Trial
Court'& distribution of property.
In Arguendo,

Lee

contends

that

the Court

applied the correct legal standard and first determined
that the premarital portion of the McGinty ranch was
really a joint venture between the parties. Since the
parties had several joint venture properties, all in
Cotton's name, the Court had ample evidence to support
its

determination

that

the

parties

had

functioned

together as a joint venture partnership. The Court's
equal distribution of the premarital portion of the ranch
was in conformity with that Finding of Fact.
The Court further determined that payment for
the marital portion of the McGinty ranch had come from
the joint monies and efforts of the parties. The Court
found that Lee McGinty had withdrawn $15,000.00 of her
premarital money and deposited same into the joint ranch
account so that Selva McGinty could write check number
1437 on September 23, 1983 in the sum of $13,638.47 to
pay off the entire remaining balance on the McGinty
11

ranch.

Applying

the

presumption

favoring

an

equal

distribution between married persons, the Court then
divided the marital portion of the McGinty ranch on a
fifty-fifty (50/50) basis. Such a division is in complete
conformity with all current caselaw.
By contrast, Cotton argues this Court to make
a pro rata distribution of the ranch. He ignores the
Court's Findings of Fact, argues only one (1) side of
disputed testimony and blatantly misrepresents facts to
this Court. His argument for a pro rata distribution
rests solely upon erroneous mathematics concerning the
source of the funds which made the payments on the
McGinty ranch.
Finally, Lee asks this Court to award costs and
attorney's fee on the grounds that this appeal has been
frivolous and has been intended solely to delay the
recovery

of

the

ranch

from

Cotton's

friend,

the

defaulting buyer, in a collusive attempt to deny Lee her
share of the marital proceeds.

12

ARGUMENT
I
SINCE THE APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND, DESPITE
SUCH EVIDENCE, DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FINDINGS WERE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS, THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER
AN ATTACK ON THE TRIAL COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY.
The Trial Court's numerous and express Findings
of Fact in the case at bar should be reviewed in light
of the guidelines found in Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
Rule 52: Findings by the Court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury..., the
court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon, and judgment shall
be
entered
pursuant
to
Rule
58A;...Findings of Fact, whether
based
on
oral
or
documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to
judge
the
credibility
of the
witnesses. The findings of a master,
to the extent that the court adopts
them, shall be considered as the
findings of the court. It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact
and conclusions of law are stated
orally and recorded in open court
following the close of the evidence
or appear in an opinion or memorandum
of decision filed by the court...
[Emphasis added by Order of the Utah
Supreme Court on October 30, 1986 and
became effective on January 1, 1987. ]
An analysis of the 1987 modification of Rule
52(a) demonstrates a clear intent to avoid retrying the
13

facts of the case at the Appellate level. Since a divorce
action is an equitable case, the Trial Courts has been
given broad discretion in making awards. Riche. v. Riche.
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App 1989); Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d
922 (Utah App 1992); Mauahan v. Mauahan. 770 P.2d 156
(Utah App 1989); Mvers v. Myers. 768 P.2d 979 (Utah App
1989); Shioii v. Shioii, 712 P.2d
Appellate

Courts

have

197

traditionally

(Utah 1985).

granted

great

deference to the Trial Court,s Findings of Fact and do
not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous.
Additionally Appellate Courts have traditionally deferred
to

the

Trial

Court

for

purposes

of

judging

the

credibility of witnesses. Rule 52(a) , Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; Myers, supra; Shioii, supra; Riche, supra.
In Riche v. Riche, supra, this Court stated:
Husband, in his brief on appeal,
refers this court to evidence which
conflicts with the trial court's
findings and supports his contention
that he should have been awarded
custody of the four children.
However, Husband does not "marshal
the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be xagainst the clear
weight of the evidence,' thus making
them *clearly erroneous.'" Bartell,
776 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker, 743
P.2d at 193) . See also Scharf v. BMG
Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985); Harker v. Condominiums Forest
Glen, Inc. , 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987). Therefore, we decline
to further consider Husband's attack
14

on the court's findings as
custody. (Riche, supra p. 468).

to

In Shioii, the Supreme Court has also expressly
provided:
On appeal from a judgment of the
Trial Court, our [Appellate Court]
role is not to substitute our own
findings for those of the Trial
Court, but to examine the record for
evidence supporting the judgment.
(Shioii. supra, at 201.)
[Emphasis added]
Given that express statement of the role of the
Appellate Court, the Appellant

is charged with the

responsibility of (1) marshalling all the evidence in
support of the Findings, and

(2) demonstrating that

despite that evidence, the Trial Court's Findings are so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
the evidence.
In the case at bar, Cotton has failed to
present any of the evidence upon which the judge based
his very detailed Findings. Instead, he has chosen to
make conclusionary statements, many of which are flagrant
misrepresentations of the actual testimony, and has
further chosen to base those conclusionary statements on
only his side of the disputed testimony. For example, in
paragraph 8 of the Court's Findings of Fact, the Court
finds

"that

the

remaining

debt

on

the

ranch

of

approximately $14,000.00 was paid off in 1983 with Lee's
separate funds". The Court's Findings of Fact were based
15

upon detailed testimony by Lee tracing her sole and
separate funds through various certificates of deposit
into the ranch account for the sole purpose of paying off
the ranch (TT pages 199 through 203). In addition to her
testimony, Lee introduced into evidence each document
that demonstrated every transfer of money from its origin
in her pre-marital account to the exact check which paid
off the

ranch

in the total

sum of

$13,638.47. By

comparison, Cotton directs you to pages 46 and 47 of the
Trial Transcript

and asserts that those pages will

demonstrate that Cotton paid Lee back $9,111.00. A review
of those pages indicates that no such statement was ever
made and that Cotton was confused and disoriented and
had

no

documentation

whatsoever

for

most

of

the

statements he made. Cross-examination on those issues (TT
96-97) clearly demonstrated that Cotton had no memory of
the events surrounding the final payoff of the ranch and
no documentation of any alleged repayment to Lee. He
couldn't remember the payoff amount for the ranch, where
the money came from, how it got into the joint account
to make the ranch payment, or how much money, if any, had
ever been paid back to Lee. By contrast, Lee testified
that she had never received any repayment of the funds
which paid off the ranch nor did she ever expect any.
Yet

in

Cotton's

brief,

this

highly

disputed

and

inconsistent testimony was ignored and only a small
16

portion
testimony

of

Cotton's

was

contradictory

included

and

in his brief.

self-serving
It

was

also

presented to this Court as though it had been fact
(Paragraph 21, Statement of Facts, Appellant's Brief,
page 7) , and check number 1437 from the ranch account was
included in Appellant's Brief (Addendum D) but Lee's
withdrawal (Exhibit 36) from her separate account and
her deposit to the ranch account

(Exhibit 37) were

ignored.
An additional example of presenting disputed
evidence as though it were fact occurs when Cotton makes
the representation that Lee received $9,965.30 from the
sale of the Miller property (Appellant's Brief, page 6,
Statement of Facts, Paragraph 13) but fails to point out
that the testimony and documentary evidence clearly
established that all of those funds were deposited back
into the family's joint personal and ranch accounts and
were utilized for the support of the family and for
improvements and general operating funds for the ranch
(TT 191-192).
Appellant's burden of proof requires that he
marshall, not ignore, the evidence which supports the
Trial Court's ruling. In the case at bar, Appellant has
presented

only

isolated

portions

of

confusing

and

contradictory disputed testimony. Since he has failed to
meet his burden of proof for Appellate review, Appellee
17

urges this Court to renew the position which it stated
in Riche,

supra,

and

declined

to

further

consider

Appellant's attack on the Trial Court's Findings with
respect to property distribution.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT THE PRE-MARITAL PORTION OF THE
MCGINTY RANCH WAS A JOINT VENTURE AND, AS SUCH, DIVIDED
THE PRE-MARITAL INTEREST EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
Trial

Courts have

always had

considerable

discretion in determining the financial interests of
divorced parties. Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108 (Utah
App. 1990). A property distribution between parties in
a divorce action should be done in a fair and systematic
fashion. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990).
In Burt, supra, this Court noted that the Trial Court
should first properly categorize the parties' property
as part of the marital estate or as separate property.
The Court also pointed out that each party is presumed
to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and
50% of the marital property. Burt, supra at 1172.
In the case at bar, the distribution of the
Trial Court is entitled to a presumption of validity and
should not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous
or an abuse of discretion. Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d
1055 (Utah App), cert, denied, 756 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987);
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993).
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Applying those standards to the case at bar,
an examination of the Trial Court's analysis indicates
that the Court separated the pre-marital interests of the
parties

from the marital

interests. The Court made

express Findings about the expectations and contributions
of each of the parties to the McGinty Ranch prior to the
date of their marriage on June 18, 1976. The Court found
that the parties began looking for a retirement home and
retirement investments during the late 1960's. (FF 7) .
The Court emphasized Lee's testimony with respect to the
conversations and agreements between she and Cotton about
the acquisition of various parcels of real estate for
investment and also the acquisition of real estate for
their future marital home. (TT 154, 155, 181). Lee
provided detailed testimony, supported by documentary
evidence,

of her

deposits

to

Cotton's

accounts

to

purchase not only the ranch but, also, other joint
investment properties such as the Miller property (TT
190-192) and the Brown/Terry property (TT 188-189) which
ultimately becomes the Jenks property (TT 186-187). The
Court completely discounted Cotton's testimony about the
alleged repayment of those transfers of money from Lee
because he could not provide any supporting documents for
his claims and because his testimony had been totally
contradictory. Judging the credibility of witnesses was
solely the discretion and prerogative of the Trial Court.
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The Trial Court made a decision to rely upon Lee's
detailed knowledge and documentary evidence rather than
Cotton's confused, disoriented and spiteful testimony.
The Trial Court's reasoning is spelled out clearly in
very specific Findings of Fact (FF 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and
15) . After reconciling all of the evidence, the Court
found that the ranch was a joint venture before the
marriage and a marital asset during the marriage (FF 10) .
Although Cotton's name was the only name on the title to
the ranch, the Court expressly refused to find that the
ranch was his sole and separate property or that it was
his pre-marital asset (FF 10) . The Court's Finding was
based upon substantial evidence about the agreements of
the parties

concerning

their mutual

investments

in

several properties. In each case, Lee had transferred
funds into Cotton's accounts and Cotton had purchased the
property in his name. (TT 182-203). Cotton received all
of the rents and/or incomes generated by the properties
and utilized same to make payments and maintain the
properties

as

the

trustee

of

the

joint

venture

investments. When a joint venture property was disposed
of, such as the Miller property, Lee was always given
one-half of the total return from the property although
she always invested all of her proceeds back into the
marriage and marital accounts. From this testimony, the
Court

entered

a

Finding

that
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Lee

had

contributed

significant sums of money to the acquisition and payment
of the ranch prior to the date of marriage. (FF 7, 8,
10) . One example of the transfer of funds centered on the
original down payment of the ranch. Contrary to the
misstatement

of

fact

in

Appellant's

Brief,

Lee's

testimony and the documentary evidence established that
all of the original $6,200.00 which was paid as a down
payment by the parties toward the ranch in December of
1970 came

from Lee's accounts. Even Cotton had to

acknowledge the transfer of three (3) separate amounts
from Lee's accounts into Cotton's personal checking
account. He admitted that the transfers had occurred and
his check ledger, in his own handwriting, reflects that
the funds came from Lee. (TT 70 - 74). In short, at the
time of the execution of the Ernest Money Agreement, more
of the money for the original $10,000.00 down payment
came from Lee than from Cotton. Additionally, the Court
received sworn testimony that Cotton was the only party
who was present in the United States for purposes of
executing the contract as Lee was still in the middle
east. The transfers and the documentary evidence also
establish that Lee was overseas at the time the documents
were actually signed for the acquisition of the ranch.
(TT 70-74 and the exhibits associated therewith). Lee
testified that Cotton held ownership to many of the
properties and that she trusted him explicitly as trustee
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for their future plans. (TT 155). After the initial
$10,000.00 down payment, the evidence showed that the
ranch began earning its own income and, even Cotton
admitted that when the first annual payment of more than
$20,000.00 came due, the ranch had actually earned part
of that next payment. (TT 182 - 183) . Since Lee had
contributed substantially to the original down payment
and was an equitable owner in the joint venture, she was
also entitled to credit for her share of the rents and
proceeds which had been earned by the ranch. Those rents
and

proceeds

were

always

reinvested

back

into the

payments and the taxes on the ranch. (TT 83).
The

Court

also

received

testimony

about

transfers of money from Lee to Cotton for improvements
to

the

ranch,

the

acquisition

of

appliances

and

furnishings for the ranch and funds for other joint
venture properties. (TT 154, 157, 158, 179-192). Having
received said testimony, the Court entered a Finding that
"Lee contributed to the acquisition and the maintenance
of the ranch both before and during the marriage and that
she did so utilizing her own money as well as her
efforts." (FF 9) . The Court further found that before the
marriage Lee had also made substantial contributions by
way of maintenance, preservation and protection of the
ranch in addition to her substantial contributions of her
sole and separate funds. (FF 10). The Court also found
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"Lee has demonstrated that she provided the funds for
half of the lump sum payments and the Court finds that
the installment payments ultimately came from joint
funds." (FF 10).
The Trial Court had before it forty-four (44)
exhibits, the majority of which were presented by Lee.
Those exhibits support the Court's Findings of Fact. By
comparison, the Plaintiff offered almost nothing. After
a thorough examination of the supporting documentation
and the preparation of a detailed set of Findings of
Fact, the Trial Court concluded that the pre-marital
portion of the McGinty ranch was a joint venture between
these parties and

awarded each of them fifty (50%)

percent. The Court also had before it documentation that
showed

that

the

parties

had

other

joint

venture

properties such as the Miller property and the Jenks
property. In each case, Cotton held the property in his
name but substantial funds had come from Lee for the
acquisition

of

the

property.

When

each

of

those

properties were sold, Lee was given fifty (50%) percent
of the gain, evidencing her equitable ownership interest
in the property. When the funds came from the sale of
the

Miller

property

and

the

Jenks

property,

Lee

contributed all of her funds back into the ranch without
ever reimbursing her sole and separate accounts for the
original

monies

which

she
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had

expended

for

the

acquisition of the joint venture properties. The Court's
Findings were based upon solid and consistent evidence.
Absent a clear abuse of discretion or evidence that the
Findings were clearly erroneous, the Appellate Court
should affirm the Trial Court's findings.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT MADE AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
MARITAL PORTION OF THE PROPERTY WHICH SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Both the Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme
Court have long held that once a Court has determined
that

something

is marital

property,

the

Court may

distribute it equitably, not withstanding which party's
name appears on the title. Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d
338 (Utah 1980); Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah
App. 1988) ; Hoaaland v. Hoaaland, 852 P.2d 1025 (Utah App
1993). In Jackson, supra, the Supreme Court stated, "the
Trial Court is empowered to make such distributions as
are just and equitable and may compel such conveyances
as are necessary to that end." In Burt, supra, the Court
held that each party is presumed to be entitled to fifty
(50%) percent of the marital property unless unusual
circumstances require otherwise. (See also Watson v.
Watson. 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992).
In the case at bar, the Trial Court had already
determined that the pre-marital interest in the ranch was
that of a joint venture between the two (2) parties.
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Irrespective of the fact that Cotton held title to the
property in a trust capacity for the joint venture, the
Court looked for further indications that the parties
continued to deal with the property as a joint asset. The
Court entered a Finding that the payments made on the
ranch from the time of the marriage until the time of
final payment were made from accounts into which each
party deposited his or her social security checks and
retirement benefits (192-202). The evidence also showed
that the parties worked hand-in-hand to improve and
beautify the ranch
testified

(TT 132-133, 198-199, 239). Lee

about remodeling and decorating the ranch

house, the bunk house and the yard. Lee described
participating
irrigation

in

lines.

planting
Her

fields

testimony

and

was

installing

supported

by

witnesses Joe Kingsley and Mr. Jenks. Lee also provided
all of the accounting and bookkeeping services for the
ranch. (FF 8) . The Court entered a Finding that the money
that paid off the ranch in the sum of almost $14,000.00
came exclusively from Lee's sole and separate funds (FF
8) . The Court further entered Findings that during the
marriage Lee had utilized her own separate money, all of
her retirement funds and income and all of her efforts
in improving the ranch and, due to Lee's substantial
contributions, both before and during the marriage, she
had enhanced the value of the ranch (FF 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) .
25

The Court also entered an express Finding that the course
of

conduct

between

the

parties

evidenced

a

joint

ownership of the property. (FF 10) . Joe Kingsley, a local
realtor testified that Cotton had always listed Lee's
name on any listing agreements concerning the sale of the
ranch. He further testified that the parties showed the
ranch together and had actually disposed of a portion of
the

ranch,

namely,

the

Jenks

property,

by

mutual

agreement. The entire testimony of witness Kingsley
supports the Court's Findings of Fact.
Based upon the Court's very specific Findings
of

Fact,

the

reasoning

evidenced

by

same

and

the

overwhelming weight of the evidence, the Court then
ordered the ranch sold and the proceeds divided equally
between the parties.
A review of the entire property distribution
will also show that the Court awarded Cotton the entire
marital savings account and the funds that he had removed
from same even though he had removed the funds in
violation of the Court's prior order (FF 18). The Court
entered a Finding that Cotton should have the account,
even though it is marital property, "in order to foster
an equitable distribution of all of the assets of the
parties". Even if there had been some minor discrepancy
in the amounts paid by each of the parties before the
marriage, awarding Cotton the entire family savings
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account, including the sums he had withdrawn in violation
of the Court order, more than equalled any additional
payments he claimed to have made prior to the marriage.
Since

the

Trial

Court

has

followed

the

presumption that marital property should be equally
divided and since the Appellant has failed to demonstrate
any abuse of discretion and has also failed to marshall
all of the evidence in support of the Court's Findings
and then demonstrate, in light of that evidence, that the
Findings

are

clearly

erroneous,

the

Trial

Court's

distribution of marital property should be affirmed.
IV
APPELLANT URGES A PRO RATA DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL
PROPERTY WHICH IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESUMPTIONS
CURRENTLY ESTABLISHED BY CASE LAW.
In the event this Court determines that the
McGinty ranch is marital property, then Appellant urges
this Court to divide the property based upon the pro rata
contribution of each. First, it should be noted that
Appellant cites no case law at all in support of his
argument. Second, most of the reasoning contained in
Appellant's argument is based upon erroneous or misstated
facts. Current case law makes it clear that marital
property should be distributed on an equal basis unless
unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings,
require otherwise. Burt, supra at 1172; Hall, supra at
1022; Watson, supra at 5. Given a clear presumption in
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favor of equally dividing marital property, the Trial
Court has not found any unusual circumstances that would
justify overriding the presumption of equality between
the parties. A review of the accurate facts indicates
that Cotton did not pay $30,000.00 of the original
$80,000.00 purchase price prior to the marriage of the
parties. The facts established that Lee provided sixty
(60%) percent of the original down payment, one-half of
all of the accumulated rents and proceeds that were
placed back into the ranch after its acquisition and
various other sums of money which were transferred into
Cotton's accounts

from

1970 until the time of the

parties' marriage. The exhibits demonstrated to the Trial
Court that a flow of cash from Lee's personal accounts
into Cotton's accounts occurred on a steady basis. Cotton
admitted most of those transfers during his testimony.
Based upon Appellant's argument, Lee would have been a
sixty (60%) percent owner of the ranch as of the date of
the execution of the Ernest Money Agreement. The ranch
then started earning its own income and that income was
contributed

into

the

next

annual

payment.

Lee

is

certainly entitled to a portion of the earned income for
her

partnership

interest.

Cotton

contributed

the

remaining balance of the first annual payment which would
have been the sum of approximately $15,000.00. The ranch
then continued to earn approximately $5,000.00 a year
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and, from its earnings, made its monthly payments and
paid the taxes. The Court entered a Finding that the
parties were equal owners in a joint venture agreement
and the evidence demonstrates an almost

fifty-fifty

(50/50) ownership in the McGinty ranch prior to the date
of the marriage. Cotton's argument completely disregards
the fact that all of the monthly payments and earnings
from the ranch were as much Lee's acquired income as
Cotton's. It also ignores the fact that numerous checks
to pay for the ranch and the improvements to the ranch
had been funded by transfers from Lee's accounts.
Cotton then makes a representation to this
Court that Lee was repaid the sum of $9,111.00. He
further asserts that the Defendant never denied the
repayment of that sum of money. Recognizing that counsel
on appeal was not the trial counsel in this matter, it
must be assumed that these statements were unintentional
misrepresentations. In reality, Lee expressly denied the
repayment to her of any of the $13,637.47 that paid off
the ranch

(TT 199 - 203) . The Court also entered a

Finding based upon the evidence that the payoff of the
ranch came solely from Lee's pre-marital funds. Cotton
merely asserts a sum of money in pages 46 and 47 of the
Trial Transcript which, when added, total $9,111.00. But
he fails to point out that during his cross-examination,
he admitted that he could remember any of the details,
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including any amounts of money that may have been repaid
to Lee. He further admits that he has no documentation
whatsoever for his allegations of repayment (96-97). The
Court obviously disregarded Cotton's testimony with good
reason.
Cotton made numerous assertions at trial which
were not supported by any evidence. He even alleged that
he made all of the monthly payments on the ranch after
the

marriage;

however,

the

overwhelming

weight

of

evidence showed that all of Lee's social security checks,
retirement pension checks and considerable sums from her
sole and separate account flowed into the personal and
ranch accounts for the day-to-day operation of the ranch
and the Court so found (FF 7 and 8). Of particular note
is the fact that Lee provided detailed evidence to the
Court as to her cash assets, which were substantial, at
the time of her marriage to Cotton, while Cotton himself
admitted that he had no cash assets at the time of the
marriage.

The

testimony

also

established

that

considerable improvements were made to the ranch after
the time of the parties' marriage. Obviously the funds
for the ranch improvement had to come from either marital
income or Lee's sole and separate funds.
The Court found that much of the value of the
ranch

had

come

from

recent

(during

the

marriage)

appreciation of the property (FF 9) . This Finding is
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based upon the testimony of witness Joe Kingsley, a local
real estate broker, who listed the McGinty ranch for many
years. The testimony established that the ranch had not
appreciated much in value from the time it was acquired
in 1970 until the time of the parties' marriage in 1976
but that the majority of appreciation had occurred during
the last couple of years of the marriage due to dramatic
economic changes in the Grand County area (TT 132)• The
Court's Finding was intended to show that much of the
appreciation of the ranch had occurred during the time
of the marriage and, while it was based upon the mutual
efforts of the parties, it was also based upon the
fortuitous economic climate. Certainly Lee was as much
entitled to that fortuitous economic increase on her
investment as was Cotton on his.
Finally, Cotton's arguments with respect to
the contributions made by each of the parties are
inaccurate. Even if one ignores the Court's express
Findings of Fact with respect to the contributions from
each

of

the

Transcript
evidence

parties,

would
from

the

an

examination

provide

the

testimony:

of

following
(1)

Lee

the Trial
undisputed
contributed

$6,200.00 of the original $10,000.00 toward the purchase
of the ranch by depositing same directly into Cotton's
accounts so that he could write the down payment check;
(2) Lee is entitled to be credited with at least one-half
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(h) of the earnings of the ranch from the time of its
purchase until the date of the marriage in 1976 as she
had an express equitable ownership interest, and the
ranch earned approximately $5,000.00 per year and all of
the money went back into the ranch; (3) amounts of
$1,500.25 and $1,800.00 were transferred from Lee to
Cotton just prior to the time of the second annual
payment; (4) from the date of the parties' marriage, all
of Lee/s social security checks and retirement income
went into the family and ranch accounts as did Cotton's
and those accounts were used to make all of the monthly
payments on the ranch;

(5) Lee conveyed substantial

amounts of money for the purchase of furniture and
appliances

for the ranch prior to the time of her

marriage;

(6)

Lee

entered

into

the

marriage

with

substantial cash holdings while Cotton had none; (7) all
of the almost $14,000.00 final payoff of the ranch came
directly from Lee. In short, if one totals the figures
outlined above, Lee had more of an interest in the ranch
than did Cotton; however, due to the mutual efforts of
these parties and the continual contributions over the
years, the Court favored the presumption that marital
property should be awarded equally to the parties. The
Court then compensated any possible pre-marital interest
to Cotton by awarding him all of the $16,000.00 family
savings account. When the entire property distribution
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is considered,

the Trial

Court's distribution

is in

compliance with the caselaw, with the presumption

of

equal distribution and with the facts as they actually
exist in the record.
V
APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEE
ON APPEAL.
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous
appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the
court determines that a motion made
or appeal taken under these rules is
either frivolous or for delay, it
shall award just damages, which may
include single or double costs, as
in
Rule
34, and/or
reasonable
attorney fees, to the prevailing
party. The court may order that the
damages be paid by the party or by
the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of
these rules, a frivolous appeal,
motion, brief or other paper is one
that is not grounded in fact, not
warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to
extend, modify or reverse existing
law. An appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper interposed
for the
purpose of delay is one interposed
for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in
the cost of litigation, or gain time
that will benefit only the party
filing the appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper.
Lee requests that she be awarded her costs and
attorney's fee on this appeal on the grounds that the
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appeal is frivolous and without merit and was intended
solely to delay the resale of the ranch. Even though the
Trial Court did not award costs and attorney's fee at
the trial level, this Court has made it clear that it has
the authority to award costs and attorney's fee under
appropriate

circumstances. Riche. supra. The recent

substantial revisions of Rule 33 define a frivolous
appeal as one that is not grounded in fact or warranted
by existing law or which is interposed for purposes of
delay. In Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987), the
Supreme Court stated that a husband's appeal from a
judgment relating to the distribution of marital property
was frivolous where there was no basis for the argument
presented and the evidence and law were mis-characterized
and misstated.
In the case at bar# a review of the testimony
of Darr Morrell Hatch, Jr., the defaulting buyer of the
McGinty ranch, and Cotton McGinty will show a collusive
relationship intended to deprive Lee of her share of the
marital

property.

Cotton's

actions

in

intentionally

circumventing his trial counsel to sell the McGinty ranch
in clear violation of the existing restraining order was
found to be an intentional contempt of court (FF 12, 20) .
Since

the

time

of Mr. Hatch's

testimony,

not

one

additional payment has been made on the property (See
Affidavit of Counsel, Addendum C, Appellee's Brief).
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Additionally, Lee's attempts to regain control of the
property from the defaulting buyer and proceed with the
resale of the ranch have been blocked by endless delays
and lack of cooperation by Cotton and the appeal has
created a cloud on title that makes the resale of the
ranch impossible (See Affidavit of Counsel, Addendum C,
Appellee's Brief)*
Appellant has failed to provide this Court with
any rational basis for overturning the Trial Court's
decision. It does not even attempt to marshall the
evidence in support of the Court's Findings and then
argue

that

the

Trial

Court's

Findings

are

clearly

erroneous or an abuse of discretion. Further, Cotton has
argued only disputed facts to this Court and has not only
ignored evidence that supported the Trial Court Findings
but has failed to even point same out to the Court and
has, on occasion, misrepresented facts. Finally, Cotton
has failed to provide this Court with any legal theory
that would give it grounds for overturning the Trial
Court or to provide any caselaw that would support his
proposed pro rata distribution. Such "lack of meritorious
issues supports Lee's contention that the sole purpose
of this appeal was to delay the disposition and resale
of the ranch as directed by the Court.
A review of Cotton's actions throughout the
trial indicates the extent to which he will go to keep
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Lee from getting her share of the proceeds from the sale
of the ranch. In violation of an express Court order, and
circumventing his trial counsel Sandy Dolowitz, Cotton
accompanied Mr. Hatch to Mr. Hatch's counsel's office in
Utah County for the purpose of selling the ranch in
violation of the restraining order that was in place
during the pendency of the action (TT 100-110, 118-122) .
Cotton received a $25,000.00 payment from Mr. Hatch but
did not disclose same to his counsel until

it was

discovered accidentally by Lee and a Motion for Order to
Show Cause in Contempt had to be filed in order to force
the disclosure of the sale agreement and freeze the
proceeds from the ranch

(ROA 97 and 98) . The sale

purported to convey every piece of household furniture,
the vehicles, the farm equipment and all other personal
property owned by the parties even though the contract
did not have an inventory list and no security agreement
was ever perfected with respect to the personal property
(TT 100-110, 118-122) . Since the date of the entry of the
Decree of Divorce, anything concerning the attempted
recovery of the property from the defaulting buyer has
been met with continued delay and acts intended to
subvert the Trial Court's order. (Affidavit of Counsel,
Addendum C, Appellee's Brief).
As in the Eames case, Lee contends that Cotton
has presented no basis in law for this Court to consider
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overturning the Trial Court's decision and his appeal is
based

on

evidence

characterized

and/or

or completely

law which

has

misstated.

been mis-

It genuinely

appears that the current appeal exists for the sole
purpose of thwarting Lee's attempts to regain control of
the ranch and re-market same. Both parties to this action
are elderly people and such delays could clearly deprive
Lee of any enjoyment of her share of the proceeds from
the sale of the ranch. Additionally, from the minor
assets Lee received at the Trial Court level, she has
incurred

substantial

costs

and

attorney's

fees

in

responding to this appeal and, therefore, she requests
that this Court find that the current appeal is without
merit and either establish a time for hearing pursuant
to Rule 33 or, alternatively, remand to the Trial Court
for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees and
Court costs on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Since Appellant has failed to marshall all of
the evidence in support of the Trial Court's Findings
and, despite such evidence, demonstrate that the Findings
were clearly erroneous, this Court should refuse to
consider an attack on the Trial Court's distribution of
property and should summarily dismiss this Appeal. In
arguendo, a review by this Court of the Trial Court's
Findings will result in the discovery that the Trial
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Court applied the standards as outlined in Burt, supra,
and determined that the premarital portion of the McGinty
ranch was a joint venture. An examination of the record
will show that the Trial Court had ample evidence from
the parties' relationships with one another on the
acquisition of various parcels of property to support the
Court's

conclusion

that

the

parties

functioned

as

partners in various joint venture partnerships prior to
their marriage and, thus, the Trial Court's decision to
equally divide the premarital portion of the property
equally

between

the

parties

was

not

an

abuse

of

discretion. Additionally, further analysis of the record
will

show

that

the

Trial

Court

then

analyzed

the

relationship of the parties toward the ranch during the
time of their marriage and found that each of the parties
had treated the ranch as a marital asset. Each party
contributed all of his or her income and time and Lee
contributed much of her premarital cash into the daily
operation of the ranch. As such, the Trial Court's
finding that the marital portion of the McGinty ranch
should be divided equally between the parties was not
erroneous and was in compliance with all current caselaw
which favors an equal distribution of marital assets
between the parties.
Appellant urges this Court to ignore all of the
presumptions

outlined

by

the
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caselaw

and,

instead,

overturn

the

Trial

Court

in

favor

of

a pro

rata

distribution of the ranch. Such a position finds no
support in the caselaw and relies upon misstatements and
misinterpretations of fact taken only from one side of
disputed testimony. In short, Appellant's appeal has
failed to provide any legal or factual basis to attack
or overturn the Trial Court's property division.
Finally, Appellee argues that the entire appeal
has been maintained solely to delay the recovery and
resale of the ranch and, thus, deprive her of her fair
share of the proceeds from its sale. She requests that
the Court set a time for hearing on the issue of an award
of her costs and attorney's fee pursuant to Rule 33 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or, alternatively,
that this Court determine that she is entitled to an
award of her costs and attorney's fee and remand to the
Trial Court for a determination of the amount of such
costs and fees.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of April,

Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDUM A
COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION

SfcVfcN I H UI51RICT COURT
Grand County

ft

FILED

JUN 1 8 1993

CLERK OF THE COURT

BY.

Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
SELVA EUGIN McGINTY,
Plaintiff,

i

vs

-

LEE McGINTY,

!:
::

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case No. 91-145
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

This case was tried on June 11, 1993.
The principal issue before the Court is whether a
ranch in Castle Vally, Utah (the "Ranch"), purchased by plaintiff
Selva Eugin McGinty ("Cotton") in 1970 is marital property.
Cotton met defendant Lee Nash McGinty ("Lee") in 1963, in Saudi
Arabia, at a time when both were employed by the Arabian American
Oil Company ("ARAMCO").

A romance blossomed almost immediately,

but marriage was not possible because of nepotism policies of
ARAMCO, and because Lee, a devout Catholic, could not marry
Cotton unless the church granted a dispensation pertaining to his
earlier marriage.

In 1975, the dispensation was received. By

June, 1976, Cotton and Lee had both retired from ARAMCO, and were
married.
Lee presented substantial evidence of her contributions
to the purchase of the Ranch.

Although Cotton claims that she

only loaned him money, which he subsequently repaid, he presented
little or no supporting documents for his claims.

Furthermore,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
McGinty v. McGinty
Page 2

monthly payments for the Ranch between 1976 and 1983, when it was
paid offf came out of the ranch account, an account frequently
supplemented by deposits from the joint accounts of the parties.
The debt on the Ranch was paid off in 1983 with separate funds of
Lee.
Lee contributed to the marriage and the Ranch both with
her own money and her own effort.

The parties lived on the Ranch

during all of their married life and made substantial improvements to it.

The Ranch, purchased for $80,000 in 1970, is now

estimated to be worth $425,000.

Though most of the appreciation

is due to the market, improvements have doubled hay production
from the Ranch.
In previous efforts to sell the Ranch, Cotton acted as
if Lee were a joint owner of the Ranch.

Lee has demonstrated

that she provided the funds for half of all lump sum payments,
and installment payments came ultimately from joint funds.

The

Court accordingly concludes that the Ranch is marital property
even though the title is in Cotton alone.
The parties agree that, at the time of separation,
there was $16,000 in a joint account and that Lee had a $14,000
certificate of deposit.

Cotton took control of the $16,000 and

has consumed it, apparently in violation of the Court's order.1

'Cotton claims to have expended the monies from day to day operation of the Ranch, a
use authorized by the Court. However, he paid his attorneys over $7,000 during the same
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The Court finds that Cotton intentionally violated the Court's
restraining order and finds him in contempt of the Court.
Lee maintains that her share of household goods is
worth $4,000 and that Cotton has disposed of those goods without
accounting to her for them.
The Court finds that each of the parties is entitled to
a decree of divorce because irreconcilable differences have
arisen between them.

The Court awards to each of the parties an

undivided one-half interest in the Ranch.
Both parties have agreed that the existing contract for
sale of the Ranch should be honored.

If, however, the contract

purchaser has not brought his obligations under the contract
current by August 1, 1993, the Court directs that action be taken
to recover the Ranch from the defaulting purchaser.

In that

event, the Court will designate Lee as the party with the power
to control those efforts, and the power to enter into negotiation
for the resale of the Ranch.

The Court has seen both parties on

the stand and has more confidence in the ability of Lee to handle
the sale in a business-like manner.

If Cotton fails to agree to

another sale, Lee may seek approval of a sale from the Court.
The Court finds that the California home once owned by
Lee was transferred to her brother and sister before the marriage

time, with no apparent source of that payment.
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and is therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
The Court awards to Lee her certificate of deposit, which it
finds to be her sole and separate property.

The Court awards to

Cotton the $16,000 account, or its residue, even though it is
marital property, to foster an equitable distribution of all
assets of the parties.

The Court awards Lee $4,000 from Cotton

for household goods that have disappeared, the car she is now
driving, and all other personal property in her possession.
Cotton is awarded personal property in his possession.
For his contempt of the Court, Cotton is required to
pay a civil fine of $200, and to pay Lee, pursuant to Section 7832-11, the sum of $1,000 for the expense she incurred in seeking
to redress the noncompliance.
The $25,000 held in escrow is divided equally between
Lee and Cotton.

The civil fine and the amounts awarded to Lee

herein shall be deducted from Cotton's share before distribution
to him.
Neither party is awarded alimony, as each has a pension
from ARAMCO and social security benefits that are adequate, when
supplemented with the assets awarded hereunder, to provide
support.

Neither party is awarded attorney's fees except as

provided above.
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Counsel for Lee is directed to prepare findings,
conclusions and a decree in conformity with this ruling.
DATED this /8'-

day of June, 1993.

Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Jvidge

Case No: 910700145 DA
Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on the /% — day of ^^UU^JL
I sent by first class mail a true and

17
correct

/r?5 .

copy of the

attached document to the following:
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Atty for Plaintiff
525 EAST 100 SOUTH, SUITE 500
P. O. BOX 11008
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84147

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE
Atty for Defendant
FIFTH STREET PLAZA, SUITE 1
475 EAST MAIN STREET
PRICE UT 84501
District Court Clerk
LA^y
By:
•: >^tcy
Z^^LZCJUA^U
Deputy Clerk
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ADDENDUM B
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND
DECREE OF DIVORCE

©FY
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Defendant
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SELVA EUGIN McGINTY,

]
|
;)

Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

LEE McGINTY
Defendant.

]i

Civil No. 91-145

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Court on the 11th day of June, 1993, the Honorable LYLE
ANDERSON, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was personally
present

and

represented

by

his

counsel,

DAVID

S. DOLOWITZ.

Defendant was personally present and represented by her counsel,
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE. The Court received sworn testimony and exhibits
and, having taken the matter under advisement and having entered
a Memorandum Decision herein, the Court now finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties hereto are residents of Grand County,

State of Utah, and had been for more than three

(3) months

immediately prior to the filing of this action.
2.

The parties were married on June 18, 1976 at Palo

Alto, California, and have been husband and wife since that time.

3.

The Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as "Cotton")

and the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as "Lee") met in 1963
in Saudi Arabia, at a time when both were employed by the Arabian
American

Oil

Company

("ARAMCO").

A

romance

blossomed

almost

immediately, but marriage was not possible because of the nepotism
policies of ARAMCO and because Lee, a devout Catholic, could not
marry Cotton unless the church granted a dispensation pertaining
to Cotton's earlier divorce. In 1975, the dispensation was received
and by June of 197 6, Cotton and Lee had both retired, or were in
the process of retiring, from ARAMCO and were finally married.
4.

There have been no children born as the issue of

this marriage and none are expected.
5.

The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have

occurred between the parties which makes it impossible for them to
reconcile their differences and, therefore, the Court finds that
each of the parties is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the
other.
6.

The Court finds that the principle issue before the

Court is whether a ranch in Castle Valley, Utah (the "Ranch"),
purchased by Cotton in 1970 is a marital asset.
7.
a retirement

The Court finds that the parties began looking for
home and retirement

investments during the late

1960's. Lee presented substantial evidence of her contributions to
the purchase of the Ranch with the understanding and belief that
the Ranch would be her retirement home. Although Cotton claims that
she only loaned him the money, which he claims he subsequently
2

repaid, he presented little or no supporting documents for his
claim.
8.

The Court finds that the monthly payments for the

Ranch between 1976 and 1983, when the Ranch was paid off, came out
of the Ranch

account,

an account

frequently

supplemented

by

deposits from the joint accounts of the parties. The Court further
finds that the remaining debt on the Ranch of approximately
FOURTEEN THOUSAND ($14,000.00) DOLLARS was paid off in 1983 with
Lee's separate funds.
9.

The

Court

finds

that

Lee

contributed

to

the

acquisition and the maintenance of the Ranch both before and during
the marriage and that she did so utilizing her own money as well
as her efforts. The parties lived on the Ranch during all of their
married life and made substantial improvements to it. The Ranch,
purchased for EIGHTY THOUSAND ($80,000.00) DOLLARS in 1970, is now
estimated

to

be

worth

FOUR

HUNDRED

TWENTY-FIVE

THOUSAND

($425,000.00) DOLLARS. Though most of the appreciation is due to
recent market increases, marital improvements have also doubled hay
production from the Ranch.
10.

In previous efforts to sell the Ranch, Cotton acted

as if Lee were a joint owner of the Ranch. Lee has signed and
participated

in Listing Agreements and Deeds for the sale of

portions of the property. Lee has demonstrated that she provided
the funds for half of the lump sum payments and the Court finds
that the installment payments ultimately came from joint funds. The
Court finds that even though the title to the Ranch was held in
3

Cotton's name alone, the Ranch was a joint venture and a marital
asset and that Lee has made substantial contributions, both before
and during the marriage, by way of the maintenance, preservation
and

protection

of

the

Ranch

in

addition

to

substantial

contributions of her sole and separate funds.
11.

At the time of separation, the parties agree that

there was SIXTEEN THOUSAND ($16,000.00) DOLLARS in a joint marital
account and that Lee had a FOURTEEN THOUSAND ($14,000.00) DOLLAR
Certificate of Deposit. The FOURTEEN THOUSAND ($14,000.00) DOLLAR
Certificate of Deposit in Lee's name is the remainder of Lee's premarital savings. The Court finds that Cotton took control of the
SIXTEEN THOUSAND ($16,000.00) DOLLAR joint family savings account
and that he has consumed it, apparently in violation of the Court's
order. Although Cotton claims to have expended the monies on the
day-to-day operation of the Ranch, a use authorized by the Court,
the Court finds that he paid his attorneys over SEVEN THOUSAND
($7,000.00) DOLLARS during the same time and had no apparent source
of that payment other than the SIXTEEN THOUSAND ($16,000.00) DOLLAR
account.
12.

From the evidence, the Court finds that Cotton

intentionally violated the Court's Restraining Order with respect
to the disposition of marital assets and finds him in contempt of
Court.
13.

The Court finds that Lee testified that household

goods, in addition to those conveyed to the buyer, were disposed
of by Cotton and that her valuation on those household goods, which
4

were

marital

assets,

was

the

total

sum

of

EIGHT

THOUSAND

($8,000.00) DOLLARS. She claims that she was entitled to an award
of FOUR THOUSAND

($4,000.00) DOLLARS for her portion of those

marital goods. Cotton testified that all of the household goods
were included in the sale, whether or not listed specifically in
the sales documents, and, therefore, the Court finds that the
parties have received fair value for same as part of the sale of
the ranch. The Court will accept Cotton's testimony on this point
and will find that the equal division of the proceeds from the sale
of the ranch would also cover the household goods.
14.
awarded

The Court finds that each of the parties should be

an undivided

improvements

one-half

interest

in the Ranch and the

and appurtenances thereto appertaining

and/or an

undivided one-half interest in the Contract of Sale and Trust Deeds
or mortgages thereon.
15.

The Court finds that Cotton entered into a Contract

of Sale and that both parties agree that said Contract of Sale for
the Ranch should be honored. The Court further finds that the
purchaser

of

the

property

is

currently

in

default

of

his

obligations. In the event that the contract purchaser has not
brought his obligations under the contract current by August 1,
1993, then the Court finds that actions should be taken to recover
the Ranch from the defaulting purchaser. In that event, the Court
finds that Lee is the more appropriate party to exercise the power
to control the enforcement of the contract and that she should be
authorized to take all steps necessary to enforce the contract or
5

recover the property and further that she be empowered to enter
into negotiations for the resale of the Ranch, should that be
necessary. The Court has seen both parties on the stand and finds
that it has more confidence in the ability of Lee to handle the
sale in a business-like manner. If Cotton fails to agree to another
sale of the Ranch or to enforcement of the Contract of Sale, the
Court finds that Lee should be authorized to seek approval for
enforcement or a sale directly from the Court.
16.

The Court finds that Lee's one-half interest in the

California home was transferred by Lee to her brother and sister
before her marriage to Cotton and, therefore, is not subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court and is not a marital asset.
17.

The Court finds that Lee should be awarded her

Certificate of Deposit which the Court finds to be her sole and
separate property.
18.

The Court finds that Cotton should be awarded the

SIXTEEN THOUSAND ($16,000.00) DOLLAR joint family savings account,
or its residue, even though it is marital property, in order to
foster an equitable distribution of all of the assets of the
parties.
19.

The Court finds that Lee should be awarded the

Lincoln automobile which she is now driving and all of the other
personal property in her possession. Cotton should be awarded those
items of personal property in his possession at this time.
20.

For his contempt of Court, the Court finds that

Cotton should be required to pay a civil fine in the of TWO HUNDRED
6

($200,00) DOLLARS and that he should further be required to pay to
Lee the sum of ONE THOUSAND ($1,000.00) DOLLARS for the expenses
she has incurred in seeking to address his non-compliance with the
Court order pursuant to Section 78-32-11, Utah Code Annotated.
21.

The Court finds that there is a sum in excess of

TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ($25,000.00) DOLLARS currently being held in
an escrow account in the names of the attorneys of record herein
on behalf of their respective parties. The funds in said escrow
represent funds received from the sale of the Ranch. Additionally,
the parties have deposited the 1991 tax refund in the sum of EIGHT
HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE ($855.00) DOLLARS and have additional earned
interest on the account. The Court finds that the escrow account
should be equally divided between Lee and Cotton but that the civil
fine and the amounts owed to Lee from Cotton should be deducted
from Cotton's share before distribution to him of his share of the
escrow account.
22.

The Court finds that each of the parties hereto has

a pension from ARAMCO and social security benefits and that each
of the parties has received an equal share of the assets awarded
herein and, therefore, each party is self-supporting. Neither party
is awarded alimony.
23.

Based upon the distribution of assets herein, the

Court finds that each of the parties is able to meet his or her
respective Court costs and attorney's fees and neither party is
awarded same herein.
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24.

The Defendant desires to have her prior name of Lee

Nash restored to her and it is appropriate for the Court to do so.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW
1.

The

Plaintiff

is

granted

a

divorce

from

the

Defendant and the Defendant is granted a divorce from the Plaintiff
on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
2.

No alimony is awarded herein to either party.

3.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain real and

personal property during this marriage and in the years leading up
to same and said property is awarded as follows:
A.

Each of the parties hereto

is awarded an

undivided one-half interest, as tenants-in-common, in the McGinty
Ranch located in Castle Valley, Grand County, State of Utah and all
of the appurtenances thereto appertaining and/or in the Contract
of Sale and security instruments concerning said Ranch and all of
the

proceeds which

result

therefrom.

In the

event

that the

purchaser of the Ranch brings the contract current no later than
August 1, 1993 and keeps same in good standing, then the parties
hereto are each awarded one-half of all of the benefits from said
contract. In the event that the purchaser under the contract fails
to bring his obligations current by August 1, 1993 or subsequently
defaults in the terms of the agreement, then Defendant Lee McGinty
is authorized to assume control and take all steps necessary to
reclaim the Ranch and/or enforce the sale contract on behalf of the
8

parties hereto. She is further empowered to enter into negotiations
for the resale of the Ranch if that should be necessary. In the
event that the Plaintiff fails to agree to the terms of a future
sale, Defendant may seek approval of the Court to confirm a resale
or enforce the Contract of Sale.
B.

The Plaintiff is awarded the SIXTEEN THOUSAND

($16,000.00) DOLLAR joint family savings account, or the residue
thereof.
C.
of

Deposit

in

The Defendant is awarded her time Certificate
the

sum

of

approximately

FOURTEEN

THOUSAND

($14,000.00) DOLLARS.
D.

The Defendant is awarded the Lincoln automobile

in her possession and the Plaintiff is awarded the vehicles which
were left in his possession at the time of separation but which he
has apparently sold. Each party is awarded those items of personal
property in his or her possession as of the date hereof.
E.

Each of the parties is awarded one-half of the

escrow account which holds the proceeds from the down payment for
the Ranch and the 1991 tax refund provided, however, that the
Plaintiff's share shall be reduced as follows:
(1)

TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS to be paid

to the Court for and as Plaintiff's civil fine for contempt; and
(2)

The

sum

of

ONE

THOUSAND

($1,000.00)

DOLLARS to be paid to the Defendant for and as reimbursement for
her costs incurred in readdressing Plaintiff's contempt; and
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4.

Neither party is awarded Court costs or attorney's

fees herein.
5.

The Court concludes from the findings that the

Plaintiff has committed a civil contempt of Court and fines the
Plaintiff the sum of TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS by way of civil
contempt fee to be

paid from Plaintiff's share of the escrow

proceeds awarded herein.
6.

The Defendant's prior name of Lee Nash is hereby

restored to her.
DATED t h i s

IftfK

day of

M/Ctsc,

T

1993.

ft,.L M

pn& R. ANDERSON "
District Court Judge

^

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
i
COUNTY OF GRAND J

M

I. th. undar»gnad Clark of * • *•*•«* Judlcml
Court in and for Grand County. Stata at Utah. «•"•/»"»
ecrtrfy that the annexed and foregoing la a true, lull and
correct eooy or an original document on flla in my omoe
as »uch Clark.
.^22^
WITNESS my hand the seal o« said Court this /<? "

day ^

(l^CU^t rt._&2
Clark
D * 5 5 t y ^ T
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COPY
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Defendant
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SELVA EUGIN McGINTY,
1

Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
LEE McGINTY
Defendant.

Civil No. 91-145

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Court on the n t h day of June, 1993, the Honorable LYLE
ANDERSON, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was personally
present

and

represented

by

his

counsel,

DAVID

S. DOLOWITZ.

Defendant was personally present and represented by her counsel,
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE. The Court received sworn testimony and exhibits
and, having taken the matter under advisement and having entered
a Memorandum Decision herein and having entered the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

The

Plaintiff

is

granted

a

divorce

from

the

Defendant and the Defendant is granted a divorce from the Plaintiff
on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
2.

No alimony is awarded herein to either party.

3.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain real and

personal property during this marriage and in the years leading up
to same and said property is awarded as follows:
A.

Each of the parties hereto

is awarded an

undivided one-half interest, as tenants-in-common, in the McGinty
Ranch located in Castle Valley, Grand County, State of Utah and all
of the appurtenances thereto appertaining and/or in the Contract
of Sale and security instruments concerning said Ranch and all of
the proceeds

which

result

therefrom.

In the

event

that the

purchaser of the Ranch brings the contract current no later than
August 1, 1993 and keeps same in good standing, then the parties
hereto are each awarded one-half of all of the benefits from said
contract. In the event that the purchaser under the contract fails
to bring his obligations current by August 1, 1993 or subsequently
defaults in the terms of the agreement, then Defendant Lee McGinty
is authorized to assume control and take all steps necessary to
reclaim the Ranch and/or enforce the sale contract on behalf of the
parties hereto. She is further empowered to enter into negotiations
for the resale of the Ranch if that should be necessary. In the
event that the Plaintiff fails to agree to the terms of a future
sale, Defendant may seek approval of the Court to confirm a resale
or enforce the Contract of Sale.
B.

The Plaintiff is awarded the SIXTEEN THOUSAND

($16,000.00) DOLLAR joint family savings account, or the residue
thereof.
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C.
of

Deposit

in

The Defendant is awarded her time Certificate
the

sum

of

approximately

FOURTEEN

THOUSAND

($14,000.00) DOLLARS.
D.

The Defendant is awarded the Lincoln automobile

in her possession and the Plaintiff is awarded the vehicles which
were left in his possession at the time of separation but which he
has apparently sold. Each party is awarded those items of personal
property in his or her possession as of the date hereof.
E.

Each of the parties is awarded one-half of the

escrow account which holds the proceeds from the down payment for
the Ranch and the 1991 tax refund provided,

however, that the

Plaintiff's share shall be reduced as follows:
(1)

TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS to be paid

to the Court for and as Plaintiff's civil fine for contempt; and
(2)

The

sum

of

ONE

THOUSAND

($1,000.00)

DOLLARS to be paid to the Defendant for and as reimbursement for
her costs incurred in readdressing Plaintiff's contempt; and
4.

Neither party is awarded Court costs or attorney's

fees herein.
5.

The

Court

concludes

from

the

findings

that

the

Plaintiff has committed a civil contempt of Court and fines the
Plaintiff the sum of TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS by way of civil
contempt

fee to be paid

from Plaintiff's

share of the escrow

proceeds awarded herein.
6.

The Defendant's prior name of Lee Nash is hereby

restored to her.

3

day o f

y/fr/4

HJA//1.
T
W/£. '*st. ^

1993.

<WX£ R. ANDERS'Q
District Court Judge
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STATE OF UTAH
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«l
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corttfy that tha anna«ad and foregone •«$ a tnia.fuHand
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as such Clark.
j * "Ch
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day 1
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19. J M
0
^
Clarlt

ft

4

ADDENDUM C
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SELVA EUGIN MCGINTY,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Vs.
LEE MCGINTY,

>
]I
;>
l

De fendant/Appe11ee.
STATE OF UTAH
County of Carbon

AFFIDAVIT OF JOANE
PAPPAS WHITE, ATTORNEY
FOR LEE NASH
Case No. 930569-CA

]

)
: ss.
)

I, Joane Pappas White, being first duly sworn upon
oath hereby depose and state as follows:
1.

I am attorney for Lee Nash formerly known as

Lee McGinty and have been her attorney throughout the trial
and appellate stages of this case.
2.

The Decree of Divorce entered on August 11,

1993 authorized Lee Nash to takes steps necessary to reclaim
the McGinty ranch in the event that the defaulting buyer did
not cure the default by August 1, 1993.
3.

The defaulting buyer, Darr Morell Hatch, Jr.

has failed to make any additional payments whatsoever since
the time of trial and yet he still remains in possession of
the McGinty ranch as of the date hereof.

4.

Lee

Nash

has

retained

the

services

of

Southeastern Utah Title Company for purposes of proceeding
with a foreclosure of the trust deed on the property but that
said title company, as well as others contacted, would not
proceed without the written authorization of Selva McGinty.
5.

Requests were made by me to Mr. McGinty's

current counsel with respect to signing documents necessary
for the foreclosure but such documents were not forthcoming.
6.

An Order to Show Cause requiring Selva McGinty

to execute documents for the foreclosure was filed with the
court on December 8, 1993. Just prior to the date of the
hearing, I received notification from Mr. McGinty's attorney
that he would sign a stipulation agreeing that Mr. McGinty
would execute documents to facilitate the foreclosure. A delay
of thirty-four (34) days existed from the filing of the Order
until the signing of the Stipulation.
7.

Documents authorizing

the

foreclosure were

prepared by the title company and were forwarded to attorney
Tucker for the signature of Selva McGinty on March 21, 1994.
In my letter of March 28, 1994 I requested that attorney
Hansen return the materials for the Title Company within ten
(10) days. The documents have never been returned and the
title company sent the attached letter indicating that they
are unable to proceed with the foreclosure due to the failure
by Mr. McGinty to return the Substitution of Trustee document.
From the date of the Order to Show Cause until the current
2

time almost five

(5) months have passed and neither Mr.

McGinty nor his lawyer have made any attempt to get the
documents to the title company even though a Stipulation and
Order requiring them to do so was entered months ago. (See
attached letter from South Eastern Utah Title Company).
8.

To the best of our information and belief Mr.

McGinty has made no attempt to regain control of the McGinty
ranch and he remains a close personal friend of Darr Hatch
and is residing in a trailer park which Mr. Hatch manages.
9.

For a period of the past six (6) months, an

alternative buyer has been waiting for the opportunity to
purchase the McGinty ranch and stands ready, willing and able
to execute purchase agreements immediately

for the ranch

property.
10.

In my opinion, Mr. McGinty has done everything

possible to delay the foreclosure proceeding and to stall the
execution of documents necessary to reclaim the property from
Darr Hatch.
DATED thiscSC*^ day of April, 1994.

~^*Q1C;

JOpE^PftPPAS WHITE "
Attorney for Appellee
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
April, 1994.

Residing At:
My Commission Expires:

JUDY SANSLOW
I ^ r f e 5 9 9 NORTH 430 WEST
m*nwW—PHIUk,UIAH 84501
COMM. EXP. 4-17-98

{

)Q^r^m

•

SAN JUAN COUNTY
P.O. BOX 579
MONTICELLO, UTAH 84535
(801) 587-2588
FAX (801) 587-2582

I B l f ^ M — K M IJfeafeMt *EJEEME\ ^gMJPABffil?
ABSTRACTS AND TITLE INSURANCE
CARBON, EMERY, GRAND, & SAN JUAN COUNTIES

April 21, 1994

• CARBON/EMERY COUNTY
175 EAST 100 SOUTH
P.O. BOX 855
PRICE, UTAH 84501
(801) 637-4455
FAX (801) 637-4459

•

GRAND COUNTY
150 EAST 100 NORTH
P.O BOX 700
MOAB, UTAH 84532
(801) 259-7635
FAX (801) 259-7637

Joane Pappas White Esq.
475 East Main, Suite 1
Price, Utah 84501
RE; McGinty
Dear Joane:
As of this date, I have not received the Substitution of Trustee document signed by Mr.
McGinty. From your letter of March 28, you gave McGinty's attorney 10 days to return the
Substitution to me. It may be a good time to urge Mr. McGinty's attorney to send that to
me. As soon as I get the Substitution, we will proceed with the forclosure.
Best Regardsi

Jerry Frandsen
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ADDENDUM E
RULE 33, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 33

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages shouJd not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is
substantially redrafted to provide definitions
and procedures for assessing penalties for delays and frivolous appeals.
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court
must award damages. This is in keeping with
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, the amount of damages — single or
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended
to make express the authority of the court to

impose sanctions upon the party or upon counsel for the party. This rule does not apply to a
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid
the conflict created for appointed counsel by
Anders v. California. 386 US 738 (1967) and
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981).
Under the law of these cases, appointed counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by
the defendant, and the court must find the appeal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the appeal.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Frivolous appeal.
—Defined.
—Sanctions.
Cited.
Frivolous appeal.
A husband's appeal from a judgment relating to alimony and distribution of marital
property was frivolous, where there was no basis for the argument presented and the evidence and law was mischaractenzed and misstated. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah
1987).
Plaintiff's counsel violated rule and was
therefore subject to sanction when, after he investigated plaintiff's malpractice action
against defendant orthodontist and found that
he could not prove breach of duty or causation,

the record was devoid of any relevant, admissible evidence showing negligence, and after losing on summary judgment, he persisted in filing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414
(Utah 1990).
An appeal brought from an action that was
properly determined to be in bad faith is necessarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).
—Defined.
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal
is one having no reasonable legal or factual
basis. Lack of good faith is not required.
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable
legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd.

